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Abstract 
Preferences among acts are analyzed in the 
style of L. Savage, but as partially ordered. 
The rationality postulates considered are 
weaker than Savage's on three counts. The 
Sure Thing Principle is derived in this set­
ting. The postulates are shown to lead to 
a characterization of generalized qualitative 
probability that includes and blends both 
traditional qualitative probability and the 
ranked structures used in logical approaches. 
1 INT RODUCTION 
In [Savage, 1954], Savage showed that a set of postu­
lates concerning rational decisions in the face of uncer­
tainty implies that the decider acts as if he/she were 
maximizing the expectation of some utility function. 
His postulates imply that a decider gives subjective 
probabilities, that obey the laws of the calculus of 
probabilities, to each event. The impact of his results 
have been felt very strongly and have strengthened the 
idea that rationality is maximization of expected util­
ity and that subjective probabilities obey the laws of 
the calculus of probabilities. A number of researchers, 
though, have contested each of those two points: A. 
Wald, prior to Savage, has defended a maximin strat­
egy irreconcilable with maximization of expected util­
ity, and the Dempster-Shafer approach, among many 
others, rejects the idea that subjective probabilities 
are probabilities. In this paper, an approach closely 
following Savage's is pursued. Some of his assump­
tions are weakened and an exact characterization of 
subjective probabilities is obtained. 
Three main criticisms may be raised against three of 
Savage's postulates. 
• In P 1, Savage [Savage, 1954] requires preference 
to be a simple order (which is a misnomer since, 
contrary to expectations, it does not imply it 
is an order relation). He recognizes that this a 
very strong assumption and writes "There is some 
temptation to explore the possibilities of analyz­
ing preference among acts as a partial ordering, 
that is, in effect to replace part 1 of the definition 
of simple ordering by the very weak proposition 
f :S: /, admitting that some pairs of acts are in­
comparable. This would seem to give expression 
to introspective sensations of indecision or vacil­
lation, which we may be reluctant to identify with 
indifference. My own conjecture is that it would 
prove a blind alley losing much in power and ad­
vancing little, if at all, in realism; but only an en­
thusiastic exploration could shed real light on the 
question." This work is a first step in this pos­
sibly blind alley. Further work is needed on the 
utility theory for generalized qualitative probabil­
ity structures. 
This assumption implies that, if a decider is un­
decided between two acts f and g, and also unde­
cided between g and h, then he/she is undecided 
between f and h. In many realistic situations, 
in which the decider has only partial information, 
this property cannot be expected to hold. Con­
sider, for example, a choice between betting heads 
in one of three different coin tosses. Coin 1 is be­
lieved to be fair. Coins 2 and 3 are unknown, i.e., 
not believed to be fair, but coin 2 is known to land 
heads more often than coin 3. In such a situation 
a decider may well be undecided between coins 1 
and 2 and also between coins 1 and 3, but defi­
nitely prefer coin 2 to coin 3. A criticism of the 
same nature may be found in [Aumann, 1962], al­
though framed in the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
setting [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947]. 
There are two different reasons one may object to 
this completeness assumption. The first one, be­
hind [Aumann, 1962], is that one may doubt that 
consequences may be totally pre-ordered, mainly 
because consequences may be multi-dimensional 
(e.g., time and money, human lives and money, or 
just a very high dimensional space) and one may 
be either reluctant to trade one dimension for the 
other or just incapable of describing a total pre­
order in a very rich space. Such a concern is at 
the basis of a large body of work on decision in a 
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many-criteria environment. 
The second reason is that one may doubt that 
subjective probabilities may be exactly described 
(i.e., events totally pre-ordered), because of one's 
uncertainty about what is unknown, or because 
one may be reluctant to compare subjective prob­
abilities of events pertaining to very different 
realms, e.g., the probability of a Republican presi­
dent being elected in 1996 (Savage's example) and 
that of a coin landing "heads" . Such a concern is 
at the basis of a large body of work on decision in 
uncertain environments. 
The results of this paper do not depend on the 
source of incompleteness. It has been elaborated 
with the second point of view in mind, though. 
• Savage's treatment of null events is disputable 
since it does not allow for events that are null 
relatively to other null events. As any treatment 
based on probabilities, or reducible to them, it 
allows conditioning on an event H only if the 
probability of H is positive. This point is made 
in [Blume et al., 1991] where non-archimedean 
probability structures are proposed, in the frame­
work of a total pre-order. There, reference is 
made to [Blackwell and Dubins, 1975] and de 
Finetti [de Finetti, 1972] is quoted as saying: 
"there seems to be no justification ... for intro­
ducing the restriction P( H) :j: 0". 
• It follows from Savage's postulate P4 that if a con­
sequence c is strictly preferred to a consequence 
d, and if the act of winning c in case of an event 
A and winning d otherwise is strictly preferred to 
winning c in case of an event B and winning d 
otherwise, then the act of winning c1 in case of A 
and winning d' otherwise is strictly preferred to 
winning c' in case of B and winning d' otherwise, 
for any consequences c1, d' such that c1 is stricly 
preferred to d'. This seems too strong. One may, 
rationally, strictly prefer winning $1M on A and 
winning $0 otherwise to winning $1M on B and 
winning $0 otherwise, be undecided between win­
ning 1c on A and $0 otherwise or winning 1c on B 
and $0 otherwise, and still prefer a sure win of lc 
to nothing. The treatment of subjective probabil­
ities in [Anscombe and Aumann, 1963], similarly, 
includes no analogue to P4. Note Savage's pes­
simistic outlook in [Savage, 1954, p. 30, Section 
2]: "Though I have not explored the latter possi­
bility carefully, I suspect that any attempt to do 
so formally leads to fruitless and endless regres­
sion". 
This work presents postulates, in the style of Savage, 
that are weak enough to answer all three criticisms 
above. Nevertheless, those postulates enable a full 
characterization of the structure of subjective proba­
bilities. 
2 DECISION IN THE FACE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
Notations follow those of [Savage, 1954]. S is a non­
empty set of states. Subsets of S are noted A, B ,  C, 
.. . and called events. We follow Savage in assuming 
that every subset of S is an event, i.e., measurable. 
The treatment of the general case, in which the mea­
surable subsets of S form only a sub-algebra of the 
power set of S poses no serious problems. F is a set 
of consequences, denoted c, d, . ... Acts are arbitrary 
functions from S to F, denoted by f, g, h, .... 
A basic problem with Savage's treatment is the elimi­
nation of the event of reference, i.e., the event on which 
the decider conditions, from the formalization. The 
preference relation shall here be indexed by an arbi­
trary event. For every event A: f ::;A g means that, 
given A, either g is strictly preferred to f or one is 
indifferent between f and g. The reason for this richer 
formalism is not a rejection of the Sure Thing Princi­
ple, which is accepted and derived, but the rejection 
of Savage's idea that comparing two acts that agree on 
A is enough to compare them given A. If A is negligi­
ble with respect to A, acts may be equivalent (on the 
whole set S) but not given A. 
Notice also that the intuitive meaning of ::; is prefer­
ence or indifference, as in [Aumann, 1962], and not 
non-preference as in [Savage, 1954]. In this way, any 
two acts may stand in four possible situations: 
• f ::;A g and g iA f, i.e., g is strictly prefered to 
f, given A, which will be denoted f <A g, 
• g ::;A f and f iA g, i.e., f is strictly prefered to 
g, given A, which will be denoted g <A f, 
• f ::;A g and g ::;A f, i.e., f and g are indifferent, 
given A, which will be denoted f ,...., A g, or 
• f iA g and g iA /, i.e., one is undecided between 
f and g, given A. 
We propose, in this work, two weakenings of Savage's 
postulates: a partial pre-order in place of a total pre­
order, and the consideration of events that are negligi­
ble with respect to other events (that may be negligi­
ble with respect to a third class of events). Those two 
weakenings are essentially orthogonal, and one may 
study either one of them in isolation. The postulates 
proposed will be presented and discussed now. The 
first two postulates require the preference relation, on 
any event A, to be a pre-order. 
(QO) f :s;A f. 
(Ql) f ::;A g, g ::;A h =? f ::;A h. 
Notice that the relation ::;A does not satisfy the first 
property of the definition of a simple ordering on p .18 
of [Savage, 1954], i.e., either f ::;A g or g ::;A /,but sat­
isfies the second property, i.e., transitivity. Postulates 
(QO) and (Ql) are therefore strictly weaker than Sav­
age's (Pl). It clearly follows from (QO) and (Ql) that, 
on any event A, <A is irreflexive and transitive, i.e., a 
strict partial order, and that ,...., A is reflexive, symmet­
ric and transitive, i.e., an equivalence relation. Notice 
that the event A may be empty: f is not strictly pre­
ferred to f, even if the empty event obtains, but one is 
indifferent between f and itself even if the empty event 
obtains. It also follows from (QO) and (Ql) that indif­
ferent acts behave in exactly the same way concerning 
the preference relation, i.e., iff "'A g then 
f""A9, h<Af, f<Ak:::} h<Ag, g<Ak. 
So far, all postulates considered one fixed event A. The 
next postulates deal with the influence of the event A 
in the relation <A. First, preferences on A should not 
depend on the values of the acts f and g outside A. 
Definition 1 Acts f, g are said to be eqmvalent on 
event A iff for every sE A, f(s) = g(s). This will be 
denoted by f =A g. 
Our postulate says only that, given A, one should be 
indifferent between acts that are equivalent on A. 
Notice that (Q2) implies (QO). A consequence of (Q2) 
is that equivalent acts are indeed equivalent with re­
spert to the preference rdation. 
Lemma 1 Iff =A f' and g =A g', then f �A g im­
plies f' �A g'. 
Another consequence is that the preference order on 
the empty event is trivial. 
Lemma 2 Vh, h', h �0 h' and therefore h f..0 h'. 
Events different from the empty event may yield a triv­
ial relation: such events will be called null events. 
Definition 2 An event A is null iff, Vh, h', h S';A h'. 
Definition 2 is similar in spirit with Savage's definition 
of null events, but technically different, since the for­
malism used here is richer and we may conditionalize 
explicitly on the event A. The next two postulates 
consider two disjoint events A and B (this assumption 
is essential), and two acts f and g that are indiffer­
ent given B .  Postulate (Q3) assumes information on 
the preferences on A to deduce information concern­
ing the preferences on AU B. Postulate (Q4) assumes 
information on AU B and deduces information on A. 
If one is indifferent between f and g given B and ei­
ther indifferent or prefers g given A, one should be 
indifferent between them given AU B or prefer g, one 
could not reasonably prefer f or even be undecided. 
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The condition A n B == 0 is essential. If it were not 
satisfied, it could be the case that one prefers g to f 
on the intersection of A and B ,  f being preferred to 
g on the symmetric difference. In such a case, it may 
well be the case that f is overall preferred to g on the 
union, but g is preferred to f on both A and B.  
Corollary 1 If  An B = 0,  f ""A g and f ""B g, then 
f ""AuB 9· 
I 
Some notation will be helpful for our next postulate. 
We shall say that A is negligible compared to B if A 
and B are disjoint and the relations of indifference and 
preference on the union AU B are exactly as on B. 
Definition 3 Assume An B = 0. We shall say that 
A is negligible compared to B and write AN B if'ih, h', 
h S';AuB h' {::} h S';B h'. 
Notice that AN B implies that Vh, h', h ""AuB h' iff 
h ....., B h' and h <AuB h' iff h <B h'. We may now ex­
press our next postulate. Suppose A and B are dis­
joint. Suppose also that, on the union AU B ,  g and 
f are indifferent or g is preferred, and that, on B, g 
and f are indifferent. Then two cases may arise: ei­
t.h�r f S';A g, explaining, in accordance with (Q3) that 
f S';AuB g, or A is negligible with respect to B .  
(Q4) An B = 0, f :::;AuB g, f ""B g :::} 
either f �A g or ANB .  
Corollary 2 If AnB =0, f""AuB9 and f""B9, 
then either f ""A g or A}l/ B. 
Our next corollary says that if  g is  strictly preferred 
to f on A, but f and g are indifferent on B, then two 
cases may occur: either A is not negligible w.r.t. B 
and g is strictly preferred to f on the union A U B,  
or, A is  negligible w.r.t. B, and therefore f and g are 
indifferent on A U B. 
Corollary 3 If An B = 0,  f <A g and f ""B g, then 
either f <AuB g or AN B. Notice that, in the second 
case, f ""AuB g. 
If g is strictly preferred to f on the union, but f and 
g are indifferent on B, g must be preferred to f on A. 
Corollary 4 If An B = 0, f <AuB g and f ""B g, 
then f <A g. 
Lemma 3 Assume An B = 0. 
f �B g, then f �AUB g. 
Proof: Let 
{ g(s) if sE A 
h( 8) = f( s) otherwise. 
If f �A g and 
(1) 
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We have, by (Q2), h �A g and h �B f. Therefore 
f SA h and f �B h. By (Q3), then f SAuB h. Sim­
ilarly, h �A g and h SB g and, therefore, h �AuB g. 
By (Ql), then, f �AuB g. I 
One may now prove a result similar to Lemma 3 for 
strict preferences. 
Lemma 4 Assume An B = 0. 
f <B g, then f <AuB g. 
If f <A g and 
A property stronger than postulate (Q4) may be con­
sidered by not allowing the second possibility in the 
conclusion: 
(Q'4) An B = 0, f SAuB g, f �n g => f .fA g. 
This property is consistent with the postulates since 
it is satisfied by models in which acts are compared 
by their expectations. We shall now show that the 
postulates above imply Savage's Sure Thing Principle 
(Postulate P2). 
Lemma 5 Let An B = 0. If !=A f', 
g =A g', f =B g and!' =B g', then f SAuB g implies 
f' SAuB g'. 
Proof: By (Q2), we have f �A/', g �A g1, f �B g 
and !' ....., B g'. If AN B ,  then f' � B g' implies 
f' ....., AuB g1• We may, therefore, without loss of gener­
ality, assume that A is not negligible with respect to B. 
Sinc e f �AuB g and f �n g, (Q4) then implies, since 
A is not negligible with respect to B ,  that f SA g. 
Therefore f' SAg' and, by (Q3), !' �AuB g'. I 
The next two postulates deal with the constant acts, 
i.e., with the preference ordering on consequences. 
Definition 4 An act f is constant iff for any s, t E S, 
f(s) = f(t). 
A constant act f may be identified with the conse­
quence f( s) for s E S. Preferences on constant acts 
are independent of the event considered. 
(Q5) If c, dare constants and A is not null, 
and c SA d, then for any event B, c �B d. 
Postulate (Q5) is a slight strengthening of Savage's 
(P3), since, in the latter, the condition on A is that A 
be not null, whereas (Q5) uses the stronger condition 
A non-empty. This strengthening is not significant for 
two reasons: 
• we could use a weaker version of ( Q5), introducing 
the notion of a null event as in Savage, and 
• null events may be treated as events of positive 
probability infinitesimally close to zero. 
From here on, preference between constants will be 
denoted � without subscript. The restriction that A 
be non-null is clearly crucial since, otherwise, for any 
h, h1, h �A h'. 
Our last postulate ensures non-triviality: there are two 
constants, i.e., consequences, one of them preferred to 
the other. 
(Q6) There are constants c, d such that d < c. 
Notice that we do not assume the set F of conse­
quences is totally or even modularly ordered (i .e. , 
d < c implies that, for any e, either d < e or e <c). 
Notice also that we have no postulate similar to Sav­
age's (P4) . The next section will show that any system 
of preferences and in differences that satisfies ( Q 1 )­
(Q6) yields a binary relation on events that enables 
us to compare the (generalized) probability of events. 
This relation enjoys extremely interesting properties. 
3 GENERALIZED QUALITATIVE 
PROBABILITY 
Postulates (Q5) and (Q6) deal with constant acts, i.e., 
acts that take only one single value. Of special impor­
tance are also acts that take only two di fferent values. 
Suppose c and d are different consequences and that 
f is an act that takes only values c and d, i.e., on 
some event A, f takes value c and on the complement 
of A, A, it takes value d. Let us devise the following 
notation: 
c d { c if sEA w' s -A ( ) - d otherwise. (2) 
Assuming d < c, w�d "wins" on A, i.e., gets on A the 
high pay-off c and "loses", i.e., gets the low pay-off d 
on A. The following may be shown. 
Lemma 6 If A U B � D, 
c,d < c,d WA _D WB 
c,d < c,d WA _AUB WB implies 
Th . f cd cd · · · B · e meanmg o w .A �AuB w B 1s: wmnmg on IS 
preferred to or indifferent with winning on A. Could 
it be that preferences depend on the prizes c and d? In 
many c ircum stances, probably not, and Savage has a 
postulate, (P4), on p. 31 to that effect. In the present 
framework, we may easily formalize this by: if d < c 
and d' < c', then 
(R) c,d < c,d --"' c' ,d
' < c' ,d' W A _AuB WB __, W A _AUB WB 
A restricted version, in which A and B are assumed 
to be disjoint, is equivalent. A difference between (R) 
and (P4) should be noted: (R) is relativized to AU B,  
as i s  our constant policy. 
We shall, after some discussion, reject this postulate, 
but let us see, first, the argument in its favor. If one 
prefers to win on B than to win on A, this should 
not depend on the prizes offered: if two horses are at 
equal odds and one prefers to wage $1,000 on one 'of 
them, "archie" than on the other one , "belle", then 
one must also prefer to wage $1 on "archie" than on 
"belle". The reason is clearly that one must think that 
the chances of "archie" winning are better than those 
of "belle" winning, and this enough to convince us to 
strictly prefer waging even a small sum on "archie" 
than on "belle", at least if the small sum is big enough 
to be strictly preferred to $0. 
Now, the argument against (R). Suppose A is an event, 
e.g., the result of a lottery, for the probability of which 
one has a precise and reliable estimation. Suppose, on 
the contrary, one has only a very fuzzy estimation of 
the probability of B. A rational decider may well, if 
the sum involved is small, prefer to bet on B than on 
A, but prefer to bet on A if the sum involved is large. 
Similarly, the choice of A orB may depend on whether 
a gain or a loss is expected. 
As explained above, we do not accept (R). Given a 
system of preferences and indifferences, one may nat­
urally define a relation on events. 
Definition 5 We shall say that A is not more plausi­
ble than B, and write A::; B iff'Vc, d, such that d < c, 
one has w�d ::;AuB w'j/. The relation::; on events will 
be said to be defined by the preference structure ::;_ on 
acts. 
The meaning of Definition 5 is he following: if one 
prefers betting on B than on A, whatever the prize is, 
it must be because one considers B as more probable 
than A. 
Let us now consider the consequences of Definition 5. 
First, one prefers losing on a less probable event than 
on a more probable event. 
Proof: Ford,...., c, by (Q5) and (Q2), w�d "'A-B w�d 
d o,d c,d s· c,d c,d b an WA '""B-A WB . mce WA =AnB WB , Y 
(Q2) and Corollary 1, we see that w�d '""AuB wt. 
For c < d, by Definition 5, w!c ::;AuB w�c Let 
f d,c d,c J' c,d d 1 c,d 1 t = W A , g = W B 1 = W B an g = W A . e 
also D =(A- B) U (B- A) and E =An B. We 
have: DnE=0, f=vf', g=vg', f=eg and 
f' = E g'. Lemma 5 (The Sure Thing Principle) says 
that f ::;vuE g implies r ::;DUE g'. I 
Before embarking on a study of the properties of the 
relations ::; on events, one would like to be convinced 
that the postulates (Ql)-(Q6) are consistent and con­
sider some models for them. Let F be the unit interval 
and assume S is a probability space, in which every 
event is measurable. Let any event of probability zero 
be null, and for A of positive probability, define f ::;A g 
iff the expected value off conditioned on A is less or 
equal to that of g conditioned on the same event. It 
is easy to see that all postulates are satisfied, and it is 
worth noticing that the stronger property (Q'4) is also 
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satisfied. The restriction that the empty event be the 
only event of probability zero is needed because (Q5) 
is a slight strengthening of Savage's (P3). Another, 
perhaps more interesting and more widely applicable, 
model of the postulates is obtained if one considers a 
non-standard probability measure on Sin which every 
event is measurable and the empty event is the only 
event of probability zero. Notice that we may have 
non-empty events of infinitesimally small probability. 
Notice also that we take F to be the standard unit 
interval and do not allow infinitesimally small conse­
quences. For A of positive probability, define f <A g 
iff the expected value off conditioned on A is less than 
that of g conditioned on the same event, and the dif­
ference is not infinitesimal. If A has zero probability, 
it is a null event. A third way of generating preferences 
is the following. Assume S is totally ordered in a way 
every event has a maximum. Intuitively s < t means 
that state t is more plausible than s to such an extent 
that, given an event that contains both, one should 
not be influenced by the consequences on s. Given an 
event A, let SA be the maximal element of A. Given 
two acts f and g and an event A, we shall compare f 
and g on A by the values they take on SA: f :SA g iff 
f(sA)::; g(sA)· 
We are now going to prove properties of the relation ::; 
on events. They parallel the definition of qualitative 
probability given by Savage in [Savage, 1954, page 32] 
and will be used as the definition of generalized qualita­
tive probabilities given in Definition 6. Our first lemma 
states that ::; is a pre-order. 
Lemma 8 The relation < on events is reflexive and 
transitive. 
As usual we shall write 
• A ,...., B for A ::; B and B :::; A, and 
• A < B for A ::; B and B � A. 
The relation '""' is an equivalence relation and < is a 
strict partial order. Lemma 8 generalizes part 1 of the 
definition of qualitative probability in [Savage, 1954, 
p. 32]: ::; is a simple ordering. We now prove results 
that parallel part 2 there: B ::; C iff BUD ::; CUD, 
provided B n D = C n D = 0. D. Dubois remarked, 
some time ago, that the two directions implied by the 
"if and only if" there were not at all equally obvious, 
or desirable. The "only if" part seems inescapable, 
and we prove now it holds for generalized qualitative 
probability. 
Lemma 9 Let AnD= B n D = 0. If A::; B, then 
AU D :S BUD. 
The "if" part does not hold in our framework. A 
weaker property will be presented in Lemma 12 but, 
first, the exact counterpart of the first part of part 3 of 
the definition of qualitative probability. We now prove 
properties that parallel property 3 there. 
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Lemma 10 For any event A, 0 ::SA. 
Corollary 5 If A� B, then A ::S B. 
The following will be helpful. 
Lemma 11 If A n B :::: 0, then 
(BUA)::SB. 
ANB iff 
Proof: Let A and B be disjoint. Suppose, 
first, that ANB. Assume d <c. We must 
show that w��A ::SBuA w�d· But this follows from 
c,d c,d 
WBUA ::::B WB 
Assume, now, that (B UA) ::S B. By (Q6) there 
are constants, c and d, such that d < c. We have 
c,d < c,d B t c,d c,d d (Q2) d WBuA _BUA WB . U WBUA ::::B WB , an an 
(Q4) imply that either w��A ::SA w�d' or ANB. In 
the second case, we are through. In the first case, 
c ::SAd, and, by (Q5), A is null, and therefore ANB. 
I 
We may now present the lemma announced above. 
Lemma12 Let AnD=BnD=0. If 
AU D ::S BUD and (DUB) 1,_ D, then A ::S B. 
Our last lemma is more original: it is a strengthening 
of the property 0 < S of the definition of subjective 
probability. It expresses the fact that a sum must be 
greater than at least one of its parts. 
Lemma 13 If A and B are disjoint events, A ::S B 
and AU B ::S A, then, A and B are null events. 
Proof: Let An B = 0, A ::S B and AU B ::SA. 
Let d < c, as guaranteed by (Q6). We know that 
c,d < c,d d c,d c,d B (Q4) · WAuB _AuB WA , an WAuB �A WA . y , eJ-
h c d c d . d . I . B . ll t er w AuB ::SB w A , I.e., c ::SB , Imp ymg IS a nu 
event, or EN A. In both cases, then, w�d ::SAuB w�d 
implies A U B is a null event. A subset of a null event 
is a null event. I 
The following corollary says that a non-null event, and 
in particular S, is strictly larger than the empty set. 
Corollary 6 An event A is null iff A ::S 0. 
We may now encapsulate the properties above in a 
definition. It strictly generalizes the definition of qual­
itative probability[Savage, 1954, p. 32]. 
Definition 6 A reflexive and transitive relation ::S on 
the subsets of S is a generalized qualitative probability 
iff: 
1. AnD= B n D = 0, A ::S B �AU D ::S BUD, 
2. AnD= B n D = 0, AU D ::S BUD, 
DUBf:D�A::SB, 
3. if An B = 0, A ::S B and AU B ::S A, then B ::S 0, 
4. for any event A, 0 ::S A. 
Notice that we do not ask that A ::S B imply B ::S A. 
This property does not follow from our requirements. 
We have shown that, given any preference structure 
satisfying (Q1)-(Q6), the relation described in Defini­
tion 5 is a generalized qualitative probability (g.q.p. ) . 
4 PROPERTIES OF GENERALIZED 
QUALITATIVE PROBABILITY 
Let us now consider properties of generalized quali­
tative probabilities. Most of the properties we shall 
prove are needed in the proof of Theorem 1, others are 
of independent interest. For lack of space, proofs will 
not be given. 
Lemma 14 • An event A is null iff 0 ::S A. 
• In a g.q.p., A� B implies A ::S B. 
• AnD= B n D = 0, AU D <BUD=> A< B. 
• AnD=BnD=0, A<B, D <BUD => 
AUD <BUD. 
• If An B = 0, A' < A and B' ::S B, then 
A' U B' ::S A U B. 
• If An B = 0 and 0 <AU B, then either 
A <  AU B orB< AU B. 
A fundamental notion is needed to study further the 
properties of g.q.p. 
Definition 7 We shall say that A is negligible with 
respect to B, and write A « B iff B 1,_ 0 and 
AUB <B-A. 
The intuition is that A is negligible w.r.t. B iff 
both An B and A-B are negligible w.r.t. B, i.e., 
B ::S B- (An B) and B ::S B U (A-B). The proper­
ties of the relation « are many and delicate to prove. 
Again no proofs will be given. The main result we 
need about « (all needed properties will easily follow) 
is that «is modular, i.e., if A« C, then, for any B, 
either A« B, orB« C. The term modular is taken 
from Gratzer [Gratzer, 1971]). 
Lemma 15 • If A� B « C, then A« C. 
• If A« B � C, then A« C. 
• IfA«B, then A< B. 
• Assume B �C. If A« C, then either A« B or 
B «C. 
• Assume B n C = 0. If A« C, then either 
A«B orB«C. 
• If A« C, then, for any B, either A« B or 
B «C. 
• If A :S B � C S D, then A � D. 
• If A� B and A'� B, then AU A'� B. 
• If A � B U B', then either A � B or A � B'. 
• If A nD = B n D = 0 and A U  D :S BUD, then 
either A:::; B or A� B UD. 
• If A nD = B n D = 0 and A U  D S BUD, then 
either AS B or (A U B)� D. 
• If A nD = 0 and AU D :::; BUD, then either 
AS B or (A U B)� D. 
• If A n B = 0, AU B S A' U B' and B' S B, then 
either AS A' or (A U A')� B'. 
It may now been shown that there is no additional 
property that should be added to the definition of 
g.q.p. 
Theorem 1 If S zs a generalized qualitative proba­
bility, there is a preference structure satisfying (Q1)­
(Q6) that defines it, in the sense of Definition 5. 
Proof: Lef F = {high, low}. Since acts can take only 
t l · f h r high low f wo va ues, every act ts o t e torm w A ' or some 
event A (A is the set of states on which the act takes 
the value high). We shall drop the upper index and 
write WA- Let us define: 
wA SD wB iff (DnA)� DorAn D:::; B n D. 
Notice immediately that WA ::;AuB WB iff A« B or 
A :::; B, which holds iff A :::; B. Therefore :::; is the 
relation defined by the preferences on acts that have 
been just defined and the only task left to us is to 
check that postulates (Ql)-(Q6) are satisfied. In fact 
property (R) is also satisfied. The proof will appear in 
the full paper. I 
5 FURTHER RESULTS 
5.1 FAMILIES OF GENERALIZED 
QUALITATIVE PROBABILITI ES 
A number of interesting families of generalized quali­
tative probabilities may be defined. 
Definition 8 • A g. q.p. is total iff for any events 
A, B, either AS B orBS A. 
• A g. q.p. is standard iff An B = 0 and A =F 0 im­
ply B < A UB. 
• A g. q.p. is purely non-standard iff A < B implies 
B-A�AUB. 
The g.q.p. generated by classical probabilistic mod­
els, as described just before Lemma 8, are both to­
tal and standard. Standard structures are generated 
by preference stuctures that satisfy a strengthening of 
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(Q4), excluding the second possibility in the conclu­
sion. A g.q.p. is standard iff it satisfies the condition: 
A :::; B implies B :SA. The g.q.p. generated by the 
non-standard probabilistic models there are total but 
not always standard. The g.q.p. generated by total 
orderings on S as described there are total and purely 
non-standard. Any purely non-standard g.q.p. is to­
tal. 
Conjecture: any generalized qualitative plausibility 
structure is the intersection of all the total g.q.p. that 
extend it. This conjecture stands, even though such 
structures are not closed under intersection. 
Open problems include the search for a uniform way of 
generating all generalized qualitative probabilities and 
the consideration of utility theory on these structures. 
The framework presented here should allow for a de­
cider to specify only a list of pairs of acts that enter 
the relations <A, for different A's and this should de­
fine a system of preferences satisfying our postulates. 
How should this system be defined? 
5.2 EQUIVALENCE OF ACTS THAT 
TAKE THE SAME VALUES ON 
EQUIVALENT EVENTS 
Let us return to the analogue of Theorem 5.2.1 of Sav­
age [Savage, 1954l: two acts that take the same val­
ues on events that are pairwise equivalent necessarily 
equivalent. Suppose, on some event A, acts f and 
g take only a finite set of values c;, i = 0, . .. , n. De­
fine, for any such i, F; (resp. G;) to be the event 
on which act f (resp. g) gets value c;. Formally, 
F; �f {sEA I f(s) = c; and G; �{sEA I g(s) � c;. 
Suppose, moreover that, for every i, F; � G;. We ex­
pect this to imply that f "'A g. I could not prove that 
this is implied by (Ql)-(Q6) and I conjecture it is not, 
but I still lack a counter-example. 
But an additional, very natural, postulate implies this 
conclusion. This additional postulate will be presented 
now. Notice that it is a natural postulate on prefer­
ences that is completely original, in the sense that it 
does not resemble any of Savage's postulates. Savage's 
Theorem 5.2.1 requires his Postulate P6, that assumes 
the existence of fine partitions. No requirement of the 
sort will be needed here. 
f ' =D-A f ,  91 =D-B 9 
and f Sen g then !' Sn g'. 
The meaning of (Q7) is the following. One concludes 
f '  :Sn g' because f :SD g and f '  is very similar to f 
and g' is very similar tog: f' =D-A f and g' =D-B g. 
The difference between f '  and f (and g' and g) lies in 
the fact that, where f has value d on A, f '  has value 
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c there (and where g has value d on A, g' has value 
c there). To simplify things, suppose d < c. Then 
f' is better than f and g1 is better than g and the 
difference lies in the difference between c and d and 
the respective sizes of A and B. The assumption that 
w�d �AuB w�/ implies, given that d < c, that B is at 
least as probable as A (at least as far as d and c are 
concerned, since we have no postulate implying this 
does not depend on the prizes d and c) . In this case, 
improving g on B (by going fromn d to c) is at least as 
significant as improving f on A in the same way, and, 
therefore, f' cannot be preferred to g'. 
In (Q7), we assumed that A and B were disjoint. One 
easily sees that this assumption may be dropped: con-
sider A' �f A - B and B' �r B - A and then use the 
Sure Thing Principle, Lemma 5. 
With the help of (Q7), we can prove the following ana­
logue to Savage's Theorem 5.2. 1. 
Theorem 2 Assume preferences on acts satisfy 
(Q1}-(Q7). Let Z be a finite subset of the set F of con­
sequences, f and g acts, and let A be an event. Assume 
that, for any s E A, both f( s) and g( s) are elements 
of Z. For any z E Z, let </>z �f {sE A I f(s):::::: z} and 
def { 'fj;z :::::: sEA I g(s) = z}. Assume that, for any z E Z, 
<f>z � 'fj;z. Then, f "'A g. 
Proof: By induction on the size of Z. If Z is empty, 
then A is empty and the claim holds by (Q2). If Z 
has one element, then f =A g and the claim holds by 
(Q2). Let us assume that Z has n + 1 elements for 
n � 1 and that the claim holds for Z of size n. 
Let z;, i = 0, 1 be distinct elements of Z. Define f' to 
be equal to f, except on rPzo where it is equal to z1. De­
fine g' to be equal tog, except on 'fj;z0 where it is equal 
to z1. On A, f' and g' take only n different values. 
Since rPz, "" 'lj;z,, for i = 0, 1 ,  by Lemma 14, we have 
rPzo U rPz1 � 'lj;zo U 'lj;z, and the assumptions of Theo­
rem 2 hold and, by the induction hypothesis, f' "'A g'. 
The conclusion that f �A g now follows from ( Q7) (we 
noticed above the restriction that the events A and B 
of (Q7) be disjoint could be removed), since r/Jz ""'fj;z 
imply 
" o 
I 
The results above may contain an avenue to strengthen 
Savage's results by weakening his (P6). It may be 
possible to replace, in the proof of Savage's Theorem 
5. 3.4, his postulate (P6) by the weaker (Q7) and some 
assumption, similar to Scott's [Scott, 1 964], implying 
that subjective probabilities are defined by probability 
measures. 
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